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Abstract 
Henry Shevlin’s paper—“How could we know when a robot was a moral patient?” – argues 
that we should recognize robots and artificial intelligence (AI) as psychological moral 
patients if they are cognitively equivalent to other beings that we already recognize as 
psychological moral patients (i.e., humans and, at least some, animals). In defending this 
cognitive equivalence strategy, Shevlin draws inspiration from the “behavioral equivalence” 
strategy that I have defended in previous work but argues that it is flawed in crucial respects. 
Unfortunately—and I guess this is hardly surprising—I cannot bring myself to agree that the 
cognitive equivalence strategy is the superior one. In this article, I try to explain why in three 
steps. First, I clarify the nature of the question that I take both myself and Shevlin to be 
answering. Second, I clear up some potential confusions about the behavioral equivalence 
strategy, addressing some other recent criticisms of it. Third, I will explain why I still favor 
the behavioral equivalence strategy over the cognitive equivalence one. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Henry Shevlin’s paper — “How could we know when a robot was a moral patient?” 
— provides a thoughtful analysis of a fascinating question.i Human moral concern is often 
quite parochial: traditionally, we only extended moral respect and courtesy to our closest 
peers (family, tribe, nation, gender etc). In more recent times, a series of moral revolutions 
has expanded the circle of moral concern beyond its parochial boundaries.ii Most of us now 
accept that all humans deserve equal moral respect; some of us take the idea of animal rights 
seriously. Will the revolution continue? Will we extend moral respect to artificial beings? 
What evidence would we call upon to answer that question? This last question, in particular, 
is what Shevlin sets out to answer. 
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In doing so, Shevlin defends something he calls the “cognitive equivalence” strategy. He 
says that we should recognise robots and artificial intelligences as psychological moral 
patients if they are cognitively equivalent to other beings that we already recognise as 
psychological moral patients (i.e. humans and, at least some, animals). In defending this 
cognitive equivalence strategy, Shevlin draws inspiration from the “behavioural equivalence” 
strategy that I have defended in previous work.iii Nevertheless, although he sees some merit 
in my approach, he criticises it for a number of shortcomings and defends the superiority of 
the cognitive equivalence strategy. 
 
I am grateful to Shevlin for the care and attention he pays my previous work. 
Unfortunately — and I guess this is hardly surprising — I cannot bring myself to agree that 
the cognitive equivalence strategy is the superior one. In the remainder of this article, I will 
try to explain why. I will do so in three stages. First, I will try to clarify the nature of the 
question that I take both myself and Shevlin to be answering. Second, I will clear up some 
potential confusions about the behavioural equivalence strategy, addressing some other recent 
criticisms of it. Third, I will explain why I still favour the behavioural equivalence strategy 
over the cognitive equivalence one. I will suggest that there may not be much disagreement 
between myself and Shevlin in practice but that, to the extent that there is, that disagreement 
should be resolved in favour of the behavioural equivalence strategy. 
 
 
2. What’s the problem? 
Both Shevlin and I are concerned with a common problem. We are both interested in the 
conditions under which artificial beings might attain some kind of moral status such that they 
can no longer be treated as mere things and must instead be owed some basic moral respect 
and moral concern. More precisely, we are interested in the evidence that we might call upon 
to determine whether an artificial being is, in fact, a psychological moral patient.  
 
This may sound straightforward enough but it is important to distinguish myself and 
Shevlin’s project from other, related, projects. In any debate about moral status, there are 
three main issues with which to contend: 
 
A - The ontological grounding of moral status - What properties or attributes must a 
being possess in order to count as a moral patient? Is it sentience? Robust preferences and 
What matters for moral status: Behavioural or Cognitive Equivalence? 
3 
desires? Some sense of self or personhood? The capacity for moral agency? There are many 
candidate theories out there. Most, as Shevlin implicitly notes, focus on psychological or 
mentalistic properties/attributes.  
 
B - The evidence of ontological grounding - How could we know whether a being 
possessed the relevant properties or attributes? What kinds of evidence point to the existence 
of sentience, robust preferences, personhood, agency and so on? Can we agree on some 
common set of markers that provide warrant for these properties? 
 
C - The inference to ontology - How do we go from the evidence to the presumption that 
the ontological properties that ground moral status are present? Do we follow some formal 
procedure or test? Is there a risk that we might overinterpret the available evidence? Is the 
inference warranted by the available evidence? 
 
All three issues are important. Lots of philosophical ink has been spilled in relation to 
issue A. But the debate about A is often conflated with the debate about B and C. Both 
myself and Shevlin are concerned with B and, to some extent, C. We care about the kinds of 
evidence that are relevant to deciding moral status and the process one must follow in order 
to infer moral status from the available evidence. Shevlin says that the relevant evidence is 
evidence of cognitive equivalence between a being whose moral status recognised and one 
whose moral status is undetermined; I claim that the relevant evidence is evidence of 
behavioural equivalence. 
 
Even though we are focused on issue B, neither myself nor Shevlin can be completely 
neutral with respect to A. In order to make defensible claims about the kinds of evidence that 
would warrant an inference to moral patiency you need to have some view on the ontological 
grounding of moral patiency. Without that, you won’t know where to look. Both myself and 
Shevlin are cognisant of this in our work. We both accept that the most widely accepted 
theories of moral patiency assume a psychological or mental grounding. We both accept that 
there is, however, some disagreement about the precise psychological or mental property (or 
set of properties) that is most significant. Neither myself nor Shevlin takes a firm view on 
this. I hesitate to speak for him but, for my part, this is because I do not think it matters too 
much which ontological theory is taken to be correct. As long as it is mentalistic or 
psychological in nature, the behavioural equivalence strategy will work. 
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3. Clarifying the Behavioural Equivalence Approach 
 
In my previous work, I haven’t used the term ‘behavioural equivalence’. I have, instead, 
argued for a theoretical position I call ethical behaviourism.iv According to ethical 
behaviourism, a sufficient ground for believing that an entity has moral status is that entity 
being roughly behaviourally equivalent to another entity of whose moral status we are 
already convinced. To put it glibly: if it acts like (another) moral patient then you are 
(probably) warranted in believing that it is a moral patient. Behaviour is interpreted broadly 
under this theory — as Shevlin notes in his discussion — to include all external signs and 
patterns that an entity might display. This could include functional patterns of activity in the 
body or brain. That said, as I will argue below, there are reasons for thinking that this kind of 
evidence is not particularly reliable when it comes to making inferences to moral status.  
 
Ethical behaviourism is a theoretical stance about the kinds of evidence we can use to 
make inferences to moral status. It is not, to repeat the point made above, a theory about the 
ontological grounding for moral status. Recent critics of ethical behaviourism, including Sven 
Nyholmv and Jilles Smids,vi have challenged ethical behaviourism on this point. In doing so I 
believe that they conflate the distinction between issues A and B that I outlined above. 
Nyholm, for example, argues that even if behavioural evidence is relevant in determining 
whether an entity has moral standing it does not follow that ontological properties are 
irrelevant to moral standing. To be more concrete, he takes issue with my claim that if an 
entity consistently and convincingly acts as if it has sentience (or whatever)vii then you are 
warranted in believing that it is sentient and you don’t need to worry about whether it really 
is sentient, on the inside. He argues that what that entity can feel — on the inside — is what 
ultimately matters. Behaviour is not the sine qua non of moral standing. But the ethical 
behaviourist can agree with this view. They can agree that sentience is the ultimate 
ontological grounding for moral status. They just qualify this by arguing that behavioural 
evidence is the best way to make inferences to the presence of sentience. Ethical 
behaviourism is, in other words, methodologically behaviourist and not ontologically 
behaviourist. 
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In practice, one applies ethical behaviourism by using comparisons and analogies. You 
take an entity of whose moral status you are already convinced and compare it to another an 
entity whose moral status is contested and uncertain. Ideally, you repeat this for multiple 
comparisons in order to reach a reasonably robust conclusion about the moral status of the 
uncertain entity. In some cases, extensive comparison may not be possible and the moral 
status of the entity may remain uncertain or be subject to a highly tentative/defeasible 
assessment. Although ethical behaviourism is practically applied through comparison and 
analogy, this does not mean that the case for ethical behaviourism depends on an argument 
from analogy. On the contrary, and to repeat myself, ethical behaviourism is a general theory 
about the kinds of evidence that are relevant to determining moral standing. From this, you 
can derive an argument from analogy that makes the case for a particular being’s moral 
standing — e.g. “robot X acts convincingly and consistently like a human, in all important 
respects, so it probably has moral status” — but you can also derive other kinds of argument, 
such as an inference to best explanation — “robot X consistently displays behaviours Y and 
Z and the best explanation for this is that it has the property of sentience which establishes 
moral status”. viii 
 
Related to this, Smids challenges my defence of ethical behaviourism for claiming to be 
neutral or agnostic with respect to the ontological grounding for moral standing.ix He claims 
that this cannot be so. You need to have some view on the ontological grounding for moral 
status in order to know which kinds of behavioural evidence might be relevant for assessing 
moral standing. For example, pain-related behaviours are only good evidence for moral 
standing if you already accept that sentience is the ontological grounding for moral status. 
This is correct and, as I conceded above, a proponent of a view like that of myself or 
Shevlin’s cannot be strictly neutral with respect to the ontological grounding. That said, it is 
possible to be relatively neutral or quasi-agnostic with respect to ontological grounding. You 
can do this by arguing, as I did above, that if the ontological grounding is a mental or 
psychological one, then no matter which precise property or set of properties is thought to 
ground moral standing, behavioural equivalence will always provide evidence for its 
presence. Alternatively, and more boldly, you can argue that even if there is some doubt as to 
the exact set of mental properties that grounds moral status, behavioural equivalence of a 
diverse and consistent type should be enough to convince you that an entity possesses moral 
status (“I don’t know exactly what it is that grounds moral status but this thing sure looks and 
acts consistently like other beings that have moral status so it probably does too”). 
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Three final points are worth mentioning before discussing the relative merits of ethical 
behaviourism vis-à-vis cognitive equivalence. First, ethical behaviourism is a claim about the 
kinds of evidence that are sufficient for moral standing, not a claim about the kinds of 
evidence that are necessary for moral standing. In this respect, I agree with Shevlin that there 
could be other types of moral status beyond that of psychological patiency. For example, 
certain artifacts or natural wonders may have moral status that has nothing to do with their 
psychological properties. Second, ethical behaviourism does not deny that people can and do 
use non-behavioural evidence to make inferences to moral status. It just argues that these 
other forms of evidence are not as reliable and so do not defeat or undermine the behavioural 
evidence. This is something I discuss in a lot of detail in previous publicationsx and it is 
important to my analysis of Shevlin’s views below: I would argue that evidence of cognitive 
equivalence is not as reliable nor as separable from behavioural evidence as he claims. 
Finally, although I have only focused on moral status in this discussion , I take ethical 
behaviourism to be a general strategy for deciding the ethical status of many relationships we 
might have with other beings. Thus, for example, I have argued that we can adopt an ethical 
behaviourist stance when trying to decide whether an artificial being is a friendxi or a lover.xii 
The only thing that varies across these different cases is the kinds of behaviours that an entity 
must display in order to count as a moral patient or a friend or a lover.  
 
4. The Problem with Cognitive Equivalence 
Shevlin, as noted in the introduction, sees some merit in my behaviourist strategy. He just 
thinks it has some significant limitations and that an alternative, cognitive equivalence 
strategy is superior. As best I can tell, the cognitive equivalence strategy would function 
almost exactly like the behavioural one. In fact, it may be intended to complement the 
behaviourist one in such a way that instead of focusing solely on behavioural evidence we 
should also focus on evidence relating to cognitive equivalence. In other words, behavioural 
evidence continues to count for something but it needs to be supplemented by cognitive 
evidence.  
 
Specifically, in his paper, Shevlin suggests that when assessing moral status we should 
look to evidence of “episodic memory, metacognitive representation and affective states”xiii 
and also “working memory, a theory of mind…[the capacity for] ‘mental time travel’ and 
creative problem-solving”, as well as the presence of an “internal representation system for 
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registering ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ events”.xiv Evidence for the existence of these kinds 
of cognitive architecture and function are what we need to establish psychological moral 
patiency. That said, to be clear, Shevlin, like myself, is not prescriptive about the exact set of 
cognitive capacities and functions that establishes moral patiency. These examples are merely 
illustrative of the kind of thing that might be relevant. 
 
 Why does Shevlin think that the behaviourist strategy is insufficient and that the 
cognitive equivalence approach is superior? On my reading, he identifies three main 
problems with the behaviourist strategy.xv  
 
The first is the underinclusivity problem. As noted above, the behavioural strategy relies 
heavily on comparisons and analogies. We work from entities whose moral status is already 
accepted to entities whose moral status is contested. This entails a kind of conservatism with 
respect to establishing claims of moral status. An entity has to be somewhat similar to another 
before the question of its moral status is entertained. What happens when you encounter an 
entity that shares no behavioural equivalency to humans or animals? As Shevlin points out, 
the behavioural strategy requires that, at best, you remain agnostic about its moral status.  
 
But why is this a flaw with the behavioural strategy? Presumably, remaining agnostic 
about the moral status of such beings is only a problem if there is some good non-behavioural 
evidence for believing that the beings in question have moral status. In other words, it is only 
a problem if we think that the behaviourist approach is underinclusive with respect to claims 
of moral status. But the presence of good, non-behavioural evidence for moral status is 
exactly what the behavioural strategy calls into question. As I have defended it, this strategy 
claims that other kinds of evidence are unreliable or misleading.xvi So how can we know that 
the theory is underinclusive unless we implicitly reject its premise? To put it another way, 
this is scenario can only be a good criticism of the behavioural equivalence strategy if you 
have some other reason for thinking that behavioural evidence is insufficient. It doesn’t work 
on its own. 
 
The second problem is the gaming problem. If we apply the strategy in practice, we will, 
presumably have to specify that certain behavioural criteria provide good evidence of moral 
status. For example, we might stipulate that consistent approach and avoidance behaviours 
displayed by an artificial being provide good evidence for robust preferences and desires (this 
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is illustrative only). Shevlin worries that if we specify such criteria there is a risk that they 
will be gamed. A sufficiently crafty AI engineer, for example, could design an AI that can 
perform these behaviours but do little else. We could then be tricked into thinking that an AI 
has moral status when it does not.  
 
This is, of course, a criticism that has been directed at the Turing Test for machine 
intelligence for quite some time. It is a good critique in some ways. There is a danger that 
behavioural criteria will be gamed. That said, gaming is a problem for all tests that purport to 
establish the existence of a psychological or mental capacity, including Shevlin’s own 
cognitive equivalence test (in fact, gaming might be a problem for all tests, period). The inner 
mental life of a being is never directly observable. We always have to work from outwardly 
visible signs and signals to inferences about inner mental life. Sometimes these signs and 
signals can be manipulated. The history of lie detection and guilty knowledge tests highlight 
this problem. Ostensibly, these tests work from the assumption that traditional behavioural 
tests for deceptiveness — such as listening to what someone has to say and trying to catch 
them out by asking tricky questions — can be gamed. They supplement these tests by looking 
to physiological and, more recently, neural markers of deceptiveness or guilty knowledge. 
But even physiological and neural marker-based tests can be gamed. The traditional lie 
detector test, for example, can be gamed through certain kinds of breathing and muscle 
clenching. Electroencephalography tests and fMRI tests can also be gamed through different 
concentration and attention-fixing practices. The bottom line is that gaming is certainly a 
problem but it is not clear that we can avoid it with any procedure for establishing moral 
status. The best we can do is to update the test parameters and insist on diverse and robust 
criteria for establishing behavioural (or, indeed, cognitive) equivalence. 
 
The third problem that Shevlin discusses is probably the most important. Unlike the 
others there is no convenient shorthand name for this problem but, in lieu of a better one, I 
will call it the ‘cognitive settler problem’. The problem is this: there are tricky cases where 
behavioural evidence doesn’t seem to settle moral status (or seems to be misleading); in these 
cases, we will need to appeal to some other kind of evidence. What evidence might that be? 
Shevlin argues that evidence regarding cognitive architecture will be crucial. An example of a 
tricky case is that of a hypothetical deep sea slug whose pain behaviour is similar to that of a 
more physiologically complex organism but who accomplishes this behaviour, not through a 
central nervous system, but through “peripheral mechanisms” in its skin.xvii The argument is 
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that the absence of a more sophisticated cognitive architecture defeats the claim it might have 
to moral status. Other tricky cases include the sometimes sophisticated behaviours of 
decapitated and decerebrated animals and hypothetical alien creatures who don’t look or act 
anything like humans or animals. The common variable across these cases is that the 
behavioural evidence points in one direction but we need to consider the evidence of 
cognitive equivalence before settling the issue of moral status.  
 
These examples sound superficially plausible. I agree with Shevlin that most people 
would  hesitate to believe that the pain behaviour of a sea slug is indicative of anything 
morally significant if it lacks a sophisticated cognitive architecture to support that behaviour. 
But the crucial question is not whether people might hesitate to do this but whether they are 
epistemically warranted in that hesitation? Shevlin seems to trust his intuitions about these 
cases more than I do. In my view, there are at least two problems with assuming that 
cognitive equivalence is what ought to settle these kinds of cases.  
 
The first problem is that appealing to cognitive evidence looks an awful lot like begging 
the question. Why assume that the sea slug lacks moral status because it lacks a sophisticated 
cognitive architecture? Why assume that behaviour alone is not enough? The only obvious 
answer is because you are already precommitted to the cognitive equivalence approach. After 
all, you could just as easily endorse the moral status of the sea slug on the grounds of 
behavioural equivalence. In fact, I would go further and argue that we should do so on the 
grounds that behavioural evidence is the superior form of evidence for psychological 
patiency. Consider, for example, the case of people with congenital hydrocephalus. Their 
brains lack certain structures that most humans have (and there are other conditions with 
similar effects on the structure of the brain). Although the condition can be severe in some 
individuals, some can be relatively behaviourally normal. Should I disregard their moral 
status because they lack certain cortical structures that I think are ‘normal’? I find it hard to 
accept that. Why adopt a different approach in the case of the sea slug? It can’t be just 
because we think certain neural structures are more important than others because, as I will 
point out below, we can only reach that conclusion by using behavioural evidence. When 
confronted with the raw data that two entities behave in a similar way but one lacks a 
sophisticated cognitive architecture, we would have to be precommitted to the cognitive 
equivalence approach to suppose that this undermines a claim to moral status. In short, these 
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kinds of tricky cases do not provide an argument for cognitive equivalence in and of 
themselves.  
 
The second problem is more fundamental and may get to the heart of the disagreement 
between myself and Shevlin. The problem is that Shevlin seems to think that behavioural 
evidence and cognitive evidence are separable. I do not think that they are. After all, 
cognitive architectures do not speak for themselves. They speak through behaviour. The 
human cognitive architecture, for example, is not that differentiated at a biological level, 
particularly at the cortical level. You would be hard pressed to work out the cognitive 
function of different brain regions just by staring at MRI scans and microscopic slices of 
neural tissue. You need behavioural evidence to tell you what the cognitive architecture does. 
This is what has happened repeatedly in the history of neuro- and cognitive science. So, for 
example, we find that people with damage to particular regions of the brain exhibit some odd 
behaviours (lack of long term memory formation; irritability and impulsiveness; language 
deficits; and so on). We then use this behavioural evidence to build up a functional map of 
the cognitive architecture. If the map is detailed enough, someone might be able to infer 
certain psychological or mental states from patterns of activity in the cognitive architecture, 
but this is only because we first used behaviour to build up the functional map. Behavioural 
evidence remains the foundation. In any event, in practice, most tests for cognitive capacity 
are behavioural in nature. For example, we don’t test for working memory or episodic 
memory by opening up people’s skulls and seeing their internal cognitive architecture. We 
ask them questions, get them to perform tasks, and then use that behavioural evidence to infer 
the presence of some underlying cognitive architecture.  
 
In sum, when we consider these tricky cases, I think we see that the cognitive equivalence 
strategy is not distinct from the behavioural equivalence strategy. They are one and the same 
thing. It’s behaviour all the way down. 
 
Or is it? I will say that there is something of a paradox at the heart of this debate. On the 
one hand, it seems like we need behaviour to make inferences about underlying cognitive 
capacity. On the other hand, it seems like we need to make assumptions about underlying 
cognitive capacity to make sense of behaviour. It is a bit of a bootstrapping paradox: how did 
this inferential loop get started? How did we first establish any link between cognition and 
behaviour? Did we just hypothesise or guess at some cognitive architecture based on 
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behaviour? The most plausible answer, I suspect, is that we started by using our own internal 
experience, and its association with behaviour, as a guide. The problem, of course, is that we 
cannot rely on our own internal experience as evidence when it comes to the moral status of 
other beings. 
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